One crime abetted, another committed

(1) Where a person abets a particular crime, or abets a crime against or in respect of a particular person or thing, and the person abetted actually commits a different crime, or commits the crime against or in respect of a different person or thing, or in a manner different from that which was intended by the abettor, the following provisions shall have effect, namely– (a) if it appears that the crime actually committed was not a probable consequence of the endeavour to commit, nor was substantially the same as the crime which the abettor intended to abet, nor within the scope of the abetment, the abettor shall be punishable for his abetment of the crime which he intended to abet in the manner provided by this Title for the punishment of crimes which are not actually committed; (b) in any other case the abettor shall be deemed to have abetted the crime which was actually committed, and shall be liable to punishment accordingly. (2) If a person abets a riot, or unlawful assembly with the knowledge that unlawful violence is intended, or is likely to be used, he is guilty of abetting violence of any kind or degree which is committed by any other person in executing the purposes of the riot or assembly, although he did not expressly intend to abet violence of that kind or degree.