When provocation shall not be admitted

(1) Notwithstanding the existence of such evidence as is referred to in section 119 (a), the crime of the accused shall not be deemed to be thereby reduced to manslaughter if it appears, either from the evidence given on his behalf, or from evidence given on the part of the prosecution– (a) that he was not in fact deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation; (b) that he acted wholly or partly from a previous purpose to cause death or harm, or to engage in an unlawful fight whether or not he would have acted on that purpose at the time or in the manner in which he did act but for the (c) that after the provocation was given, and before he did the act which caused the harm, such a time elapsed or such circumstances occurred that a person of ordinary character might have recovered his self-control; or (d) that his act was, in respect either of the instrument or means used, or of the cruel or other manner in which it was used, greatly in 93 excess of the measure in which a person of character would have been likely under the circumstances to be deprived of his self- control by the provocation. (2) Where a person in the course of a fight uses any deadly or dangerous means against an adversary who has not used or commenced to use any deadly or dangerous means against him, if it appears that the accused person purposed or prepared to use such means before he had received any such blow or hurt in the fight as might be a sufficient provocation to use means of that kind, he shall be presumed to have used the means from a previous purpose to cause death, notwithstanding that before the actual use of the means he may have received any such blow or hurt in the fight as might amount to extreme provocation.